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Fair Chances and Hard Work? 
Families making sense of inequality and opportunity in 21st Century Britain 
Abstract 
In British social mobility discourse, the rhetoric of fair access can obscure wider issues of 
social justice. While socio-economic inequalities continue to shape young people’s lives, 
sociological work on class dis-identification suggests social class is less obviously meaningful 
as a source of individual and collective identity. This paper considers subjective 
understandings of the post-16 education and employment landscape in this context, 
drawing on qualitative research exploring the aspirations of young men and women as they 
completed compulsory education in North West England, and the hopes their parents had 
for their future. It shows how unequal access to resources shaped the older generation’s 
expectations for their children, although this was rarely articulated using the explicit 
language of class. Their children recognized they faced a difficult job market but embraced 
the idea that success was possible through hard work. Both generations drew moral 
boundaries and made judgments based on implicit classed discourses about undeserving 
others, while at the same time disavowing class identities. There was a more explicit 
recognition of gender inequality among the parents framed with reference to hopes for 
greater freedom for their daughters. Opportunities and inequalities were thus understood 
in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. 
  






Fair Chances and Hard Work? 




In contemporary Britain, education is seen as the key institutional pathway to upward social 
mobility. Over the past twenty years, the New Labour governments (1997-2010), the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition (2010-2015) and now the Conservatives have all 
focused policy attention on improving educational outcomes through providing equality of 
opportunity. At the time of writing, Prime Minister Theresa May had just unveiled 
Conservative educational reforms centred on the idea of the UK as a ‘great meritocracy’: 
…. a country where everyone has a fair chance to go as far as their talent and their 
hard work will allow… I want Britain to be a place where advantage is based on merit 
not privilege; where it's your talent and hard work that matter. (May 2016). 
In this context of ‘fair chances and hard work’ that enables young people to succeed 
according to their talent, this paper asks: what ideas do young people coming to the end of 
compulsory education have about what is fair and unfair? How do these compare to their 
parents’ views? What is the role of social class (if any) in their understandings of 
opportunities for and the fairness of social mobility? Subjectivities of class present a 
paradox in twenty-first century Britain, in which people generally object to class as a 
category because they believe in the principle of meritocracy, yet often implicitly feel and 
express class boundaries and identities (Savage et al. 2015). This paper brings together two 
related areas of interest to explore subjective understandings of the post-16 education and 
employment landscape: sociological concerns with the apparent decline in class identities; 
and policy / public concerns with the apparent decline in social mobility. 
  
In order to conceptualise these subjectivities, we draw on the idea of a ‘social imaginary’ 
(Angus, 2015; Ball, 2012; Rivzi and Lingard 2013; Taylor 2004). This concept aims to 
encapsulate a ‘way of thinking shared in a society by ordinary people, the common 
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understandings that make everyday life possible, giving them sense and legitimacy’ (Rivzi 
and Lingard 2010: 34).  We start by reviewing current debates on social mobility and class 
identities and note the context of a neoliberal social imaginary, where educational policy is 
shaped by the dominance of market logic (Ball 2012; Rivzi and Lingard 2010). We then 
introduce the location of our study, the sample of young people and their parents, and the 
qualitative interviews which form the basis of our data. The paper then considers four major 
themes that emerged from our analysis. Firstly, we explore how our sample talked about 
class, with claims to ordinariness and a disavowal of positive class identities.  Secondly, we 
discuss how our sample drew implicit classed boundaries around issues of culture and 
morality (including ideas of a ‘benefits culture’, ‘bad parenting’ and ‘chavs’). Thirdly, we 
suggest our data demonstrate the complexities and contradictions of trying to articulate a 
competitive educational and employment market using the language of the neoliberal social 
imaginary. Fourthly, we also explore gender inequalities and how social mobility is premised 
upon delayed motherhood and ‘getting away’. The paper concludes by highlighting the 
importance of considering class dis-identification when exploring how young people and 
their parents talk about education-employment transitions, generational differences, and 
how these are articulated looking to the past, present and future. 
   
Social mobility, ‘fairness’, and class identities 
The families in our study were reflecting on inequality and opportunity in a context where a 
particular social mobility discourse has become dominant (Payne 2017).  Consecutive British 
governments in the 21st Century have focused on social mobility as a tool to tackle 
inequality, promoting the idea that young people being able to 'move up’ occupational 
classes is a fundamental principle of a ‘fair society’: ‘fairness is about social mobility – the 
degree to which the patterns of advantage and disadvantage in one generation are passed 
onto the next’ (Cabinet Office 2011: 11). This understanding of fairness is part of the 
contemporary ‘social imaginary’, a concept developed by Taylor (2004) to describe the 
largely implicit ways of thinking about the world that are embedded in both everyday social 
practice and wider ideologies. Rivzi and Lingard (2010) argue global education has been 
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shaped by a dominant neoliberal social imaginary. This ‘promotes markets over the state 
and regulation and individual advancement/self-interest over the collective good and 
common well being’ (Lingard 2009, cited in Ball 2012: 2).  The Prime Minister’s ‘great 
meritocracy’ speech (May 2016) is grounded in the neoliberal social imaginary in which 
success – defined as social mobility – is possible for individuals if there is equality of 
opportunity rooted in choice and competition. From this position, inequalities are no longer 
a problem if anyone can succeed, but this neglects ongoing evidence that those who start 
the competition from a more advantaged position and who have more resources to draw 
upon have a much better chance of winning the game (Savage et al. 2015). 
  
Such class advantages have remained remarkably consistent over time. Overall, relative 
occupational class mobility in the UK – the respective chances of people born in different 
classes ending up in one class rather than another as an adult – has been fairly constant, 
even during the ‘Golden Age’ of the post-war 20th Century, when structural change meant 
there was more ‘room at the top’ (Goldthorpe 2016). The total absolute mobility rate – the 
extent of mobility or immobility within the population - has also been stable (Goldthorpe 
2016; Payne 2017). What has changed in more recent years is that upward absolute mobility 
rates are decreasing and downward absolute mobility rates are increasing, a reversal of 
previous trends, which puts more people born into advantaged positions ‘at risk’ from 
mobility (Goldthorpe 2016). Such nuances in sociological research on social mobility are 
missing from the dominant policy rhetoric. Not ‘everyone can be winners’ in a meritocratic 
system yet this is overlooked in such political discourse (Payne 2017). 
 
Our interest in these debates concerns the extent to which the dominant framework of 
understanding – the neoliberal imaginary – is evident in how different generations make 
sense of the educational and employment opportunities available to young people at a 
transitional moment in their lives. While we might expect younger generations to be more 
progressive in their orientations, we also need to consider the prevailing values when 
people ‘come of age’. Research from political science suggests that neoliberalism became 
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normalised rather than challenged during the New Labour years in the UK so that political 
attitudes of younger people shifted even further to the right of those of ‘Thatcher’s 
Children’ (Grasso et al. 2017), which now may be fully entrenched. In addition, we consider 
the extent to which ideas about fairness draw solely on an individualised framing, or 
whether social class identification has any relevance for the families’ perspectives on young 
people’s trajectories. 
  
Since the 1990s, sociologists have been concerned with the apparent decline in overt class 
identification, despite persistent inequalities (Savage 2000). This has led to proclamations 
that class is a ‘zombie category’ (Beck 1992); informing a debate which is well rehearsed in 
youth sociology (Threadgold 2011). In this paper, we draw on perspectives from ‘cultural 
class analysis’ on dis-identification (Skeggs 1997) and concerns with ‘ordinariness’ (Devine 
1992; Savage et al. 2001). Such perspectives address how subjective understandings of 
inequality are framed through individualised hierarchies, where class disappears as an 
explicit reference point (Bottero 2004). One implication for youth in particular is what 
Furlong and Cartmel (2007) call the ‘epistemological fallacy of late modernity’, in which 
young people look to individual explanations for their paths in life, and consequently take 
responsibility for them, even when structural forces remain determining factors in what 
shape these paths take. Recent evaluations of this concept argue that there is a reflexive, 
implicit acknowledgement of class in young people’s narratives (France and Haddon 2014) 
or that they may have a belief in their own agency while also remaining ambivalent to these 
individualised explanations (Farthing 2016). In previous work, Devine (2004) suggests that a 
fruitful point of exploration is the contexts in which class is articulated, and when it is not, in 
order to understand its salience. Of concern here  is if and when class comes into frame 
when young people and their parents make sense of educational and employment 
opportunities. In this way, we contribute to sociological knowledge on the discourse of 
meritocracy as a reference point for everyday talk about fairness and if there are 
generational differences in how this discourse is articulated. We find parallels with more 
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general debates surrounding simultaneous disavowal of class and the ongoing power of 
classed subjectivities (Savage et al. 2015). 
 
Method 
The data presented here is drawn from a research project conducted in ‘Heathside’, a town 
located within a metropolitan local authority in the North of England. The local authority 
had a population of 220,000 at the 2011 Census, with a mixture of urban and semi-rural 
areas. Heathside is a traditional working class locality with a manufacturing past, although 
like many industrial towns in the North, work in this sector has declined. Employment, 
where it is available, is in lower-level service work and food factories. The working class 
population is larger than the national average and the area is 91% Whiteii. At the time of the 
research in 2010, unemployment was 8.3% compared to the national rate of 7.7%, and the 
proportion of workless households was 22.5% compared to 18.9% of the national 
population. 
  
The study focused on young people’s choices and decisions for their next steps at 16 years 
old, which, at the time of the research, was the end of compulsory schooling. All of our 
young people were 15-16, White, and in their final year (Year 11) at the same high school, 
‘Ashley’. Ashley was a new community school that was funded by the local authority but had 
been built by a private finance initiative to replace a failing school nearby. Examination 
results were improving but average, although the school was rated as 'requires 
improvement' by Ofsted. There was a sense of pride among our interviewees over the state 
of the art facilities, and that the new school offered a fresh start and a new potential for 
success. Our contact teacher was keen to stress that the school culture placed a great deal 
of emphasis on being enterprising, working hard and taking personal responsibility to avoid 
the ranks of the local unemployed. The interviews were therefore taking place within an 




The sample we draw on here is a subgroup of the wider research, consisting of 8 young men 
and 8 young women. We characterise their post-16 pathways as: Traditional A-Levels, 'New' 
A-Levels, and Vocational/Otheriii (see Table 1). Interviews were conducted in 2010 with 
these young people at school or at home, and with at least one of their parents or 
guardians. 19 parents in total were interviewed: 14 mothers, 1 female carer and 4 fathers . 
All had grown up in or around Heathside, or in the wider metropolitan area. The majority of 
the parents had working class origins, with some benefiting from a degree of upward 
mobility over the course of their working lives (see Table 2). Given the profile of Heathside, 
we found more variation in the class composition of the sample than we expected.  These 
details were woven into their life stories, and represent our reading of their narratives 
rather than systematic data. The parents’ trajectories also highlight the complexities of class 
categorisation. For these reasons, we have exercised caution in our analysis of differences 
between class fractions. 
  
TABLE 1 HERE 
TABLE 2 HERE 
  
The interviews focused on the next steps the young people were hoping to take after their 
GCSEs, which they were due to sit in the summer of 2010. They were asked questions about 
their experiences of school, which college they hoped to attend, what courses they wanted 
to take, and their aspirations for the future. Their parents were asked about their 
backgrounds, their own educational and employment experiences, and what they hoped for 
their children. Both generations were also asked to consider issues of equality/inequality, 
education and employment opportunities, and whether social class shaped people's lives. 
Our colleague Mikaela Luttrell-Rowland (2016) analysed this data to explore young people’s 
understandings of inequality in which they emphasise hard work and self-determination as 
the driver of social mobility. We expand upon these findings to consider the perspectives of 
parents along with the young people themselves, and place these in the context of 
sociological critiques of the meritocratic discourse and the implications for the 
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contemporary politics of class. Given the debates surrounding the decline of class 
identification as discussed above, we were particularly interested in whether the two 
generations spoke about class differences, and how: explicitly or implicitly, prompted or 
unprompted. 
  
Class and class identities 
As Table 2 shows, some of the parents had grown up in families that were better off than 
others. Yet across their narratives, similar ideas cropped up describing their childhood: 
being comfortable (rather than wealthy or poor), average, and ordinary. Aileen’s parents 
were a painter and decorator and home-help. She describes their standard of living with 
reference to hard work and respectability: 
Erm it was comfortable. Me mum and dad worked hard. They worked really hard for 
what we had. You know we never did without, but they worked really hard … I mean 
- you know sometimes they must have been absolutely shattered when they came 
in, you know, and then me mum’d have to start cooking and she wouldn’t just make 
us beans on toast, we’d have a proper dinner. And the table was always set nice, you 
know, a tablecloth on and she always did it properly (Aileen, carer). 
Sociological work on class identification has noted how individuals wish to highlight their 
‘ordinariness’ (Devine 1992; Savage et al. 2001). It also indicates the continued salience of 
the idea of respectability and hard work – like Aileen’s mother’s standards – as a way to 
avoid being seen as part of the ‘rough’ working classes (Skeggs 1997). We see these 
descriptions of background as contributing to the evidence for the disavowal of class 
identities. (Savage, Silva and Warde 2010). None of the parents described growing up in an 
ordinary working-class family. Class did not play an explicit role in their understanding of 
where they had come from. Consequently, we might wonder whether class plays any kind of 
role in their understanding of their present or future, and particularly where their children 




This was a complex and contradictory issue. When asked if class ‘matters’, 4 out of 5 of our 
middle class parents agreed, reflecting upon economic advantages, such as those that might 
be helpful in education, alongside the importance of social networks: ‘it’s not what you 
know but who you know’iv. The picture among our intermediate and working class parents 
was more mixed, with half agreeing and the other disagreeing. Those who thought class 
mattered referred to inequalities of power and political weight, and spoke of the ‘haves and 
have-nots’ in abstract terms. Alongside this discussion of unevenly distributed resources 
was a renunciation of the idea of class. Two of our working class mothers rejected class on a 
personal level. Hannah simultaneously recognised the power of economic capital – ‘money 
talks’ –  but also suggested that accepting class advantage would suggest the middle classes 
were ‘better’:  
Interviewer: Some people say that if you were from a working class family you’ll have 
different chances than if you were from a rich family. 
Hannah: Yeah well that’s a load of rubbish is that. 
Interviewer: Really? 
Hannah: Well I think it is yeah. I really do. It’s not fair that. 
Interviewer: But do you think that’s true or not? 
Hannah: Um money talks. No I don’t think that’s true no. I think working class can do 
just as good – as good as any class and you know middle class, working class 
whatever (Hannah, Carer). 
Hannah rejected class as it would validate classed hierarchies (Savage et al. 2015).  
  
In contrast, class was much more ambivalent in young people’s narratives, with inequalities 
described in individualised terms. Two of our middle class children and three of our 
intermediate class children recognised class inequality but this was in terms of 
individualised class judgements, of ‘people looking down on you’ (Emily, Traditional A 
Levels). Holly considered how this might be a problem when looking for a job.   
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Holly: Yes, I think it could sometimes like they’d give it to, they’d give a job to like a 
middle-class person more than a lower-class one, because like they might be a bit 
scruffy or whatever. 
Interviewer: What do you think about that? 
Holly: Well, that’s wrong, because, like the scruffier person might have qualifications 
that the middle-class person doesn’t have (Holly, vocational). 
Conversely, the other young people either misunderstood the question (and thought the 
interviewer was talking about classes at schools) or broadly agreed with meritocratic 
principles. Success was down to individual hard work. When asked whether she thought 
class ‘matters’, Amanda responded: 
Erm, it depends how hard you work as an individual… Because if you don’t try at all 
to get your GCSEs then you’re not gonna be able to get the job you want. (Amanda, 
‘New’ A Levels) 
Mendick, Allen and Harvey (2015) suggest young people are growing up in a ‘hard work 
zeitgeist’, an imaginary of meritocracy, in which structural constraints can be overcome to 
achieve success regardless of background. Although the young people acknowledged 
inequality, there was not the same consideration of collective inequalities based on 
resources as evidenced in their parents’ accounts. Nor was the respectability of hard work 
claimed as a particular ordinary identity as in their parents’ narratives, but instead was a 
way of marking out who deserved to do well.  
  
Discussions across the interviews suggested that the young people thought class location 
was a reflection of the individuals concerned: ‘it shows you as a person’; ‘people are just the 
way they are’. Through the prism of meritocracy, structural inequalities are refracted as 
evidence of personal attributes. Yet these young people were fully aware of the stigma 
attached to particular positions without claiming a class identity of their own. Class labels 
were something to be avoided, especially that of the ‘chav’, characterised by deviant 
behaviour and coded by their tasteless clothing and stylev. As we discuss in the following 
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section, the way that class was drawn on as a category was on the basis of individualised – 
and moralised – value judgements (Savage et al 2015; Skeggs 1997). 
  
Despite this, there were two young people, and two parents, who made spontaneous 
references to class difference. In considering the context of when class is articulated (Devine 
2004), the young people’s references seemed to come from situations of a sudden 
awareness of difference. Tony, whose divorced mother was a postal delivery worker, had a 
complicated class background, describing his grandparents as well off but was now living in 
reduced circumstances. Unprompted, Tony declared he was ‘upper class and rich’. 
Conversely, Amanda rejected a local sixth-form college due to her discomfort at feeling out 
of place when visiting because the students were ‘upper class’. One of the fathers, Noel, 
also spontaneously referred to class difference. He was a teaching assistant who (unusually) 
had spent considerable time as a stay-at-home dad and the rest of his working life doing 
odd jobs. He was the only parent to reluctantly describe his background with an explicit 
reference to class: ‘I suppose you’d have to call it like middle-class’. His own parents – a 
teacher and office manager – could afford to send him to a local grammar school as a paying 
pupil. Noel hated his school days and left as soon as possible. He viewed the majority of his 
schoolmates from ‘upper-class families, wealthy families’ who looked down on him. His 
father, a teacher who was ‘all for school for schools and everything’ but Noel did not feel 
comfortably part of this world:  
I tended to hang around with the ones who didn’t sort of fit in er – theirs was the 
same as mine to a degree where they didn’t like it, and when I was 14 I made me 
mind up that I was leaving school when I was 16, as soon as I could (Noel, teaching 
assistant). 
 
 Another father, Adrian, explicitly referred to class in relation to exploitation and conflict, 
rather than based on cultural difference or feeling out of place. Discussing what he’d like to 
say to the current Prime Minister, he said: 
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I think he [the Prime Minister] wants to listen to the lower classes more. Instead of 
the upper class […] They are the upper crust, they don’t have the same problems as 
us. We’ve got to – we’ve got a fight from the beginning, they don’t; they’re already 
three quarters up the ladder (Adrian, painter & decorator) 
Following Bourdieu, we could suggest that for some participants like Tony, Amanda and 
Noel, it was at points of disjuncture – feeling out of place, a ‘fish out of water’ – that class 
may come to the fore as a reference point (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Yet in Adrian’s 
case, it was difficult to see – beyond being in the reflexive space of an interview – where this 
‘class consciousness’ had arisen in a particular moment in time. Indeed, discussing his 
biography and that of his family, it seemed more likely that this was the outcome of a 
lifetime of just about getting by as a self-employed painter and decorator. In over 30 
interviews, his was the only specific reference to class politics. None of our families 
discussed trade union membership, for example, despite the town’s industrial past. Adrian 
was articulating inequality with reference to class positions that the other parents had 
acknowledged implicitly, yet struggled to articulate using the contemporary discourses 
available (Luttrell-Rowland 2016). In contrast, participants were much more likely to discuss 
what they perceived to be unfair in terms of preferential treatment of an undeserving 
underclass. 
  
Culture and morality: unfairness in contemporary Britain 
The idea that there is an ‘underclass’ in British society has continued to hold traction in both 
popular and political understandings of the causes of poverty. Class is divorced from 
structural context, and instead a product of deviant lifestyles and poor choices (Tyler 2013). 
In our sample, both generations were concerned about the perceived advantages of and 
attention bestowed on disengaged or ‘troubled’ young people. These were class-laden value 
judgements, but predicated on issues of morality and individual or family pathologies so 
that class disappears from view. It was unfair that resources are directed at these products 
of an ‘underclass’, as they are undeserving. A ‘benefits culture’ was referred to by three of 
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our mothers. One middle class mother, Lois, reflected that those ‘on benefits’ were better 
off than those in work: 
They let them just sit … I’m not gonna say without sounding really awful, people who 
– who are on benefits, do sit down and just think it’s easy just to take the benefits 
and … believe me, it is sometimes easier. I know because I know people who are on 
benefits who go out to work and are actually worse off (Lois, Housing Officer). 
These sentiments were not limited to the more advantaged parents, however. Aileen, one 
of our working class mothers, agreed with Lois, stating that such families were better off 
than her hard-working family.  
 
Of particular relevance to these families was the Educational Maintenance Allowance 
(EMA). At the time of the interviews (2010) this incentive of up to £30 per week for young 
people from low-income families to stay in full-time education post-16 was still in place, 
although was abolished in England shortly afterwards. Both June and Sarah’s children were 
not eligible due to their household income exceeding the threshold, and they saw this 
scheme as unfair: 
Lucy will get no help, obviously because of mine and [her husband’s] salary but I 
think it’s really unfair. Because she will attend every lesson every week, why should 
she be penalised? (June, Accounts Supervisor) 
The stigma associated with benefits provides a suggestion as to why the parents identified 
their backgrounds as ordinary, rather than working class. In the contemporary neoliberal 
social imaginary, both the deserving poor and the respectable working class disappear and 
only the undeserving ‘underclass’ remain. Poverty has become a 'lack of respectability and 
inability to manage, a moral failure worthy of blame' (Shildrick and Macdonald 2013: 293). 
June’s feelings rest upon this principle, because rather than seeing those on low incomes 
requiring help, they are in such positions through their own moral failings.  
 
Reflecting on what is fair and unfair prompted discussions of individual morality rather than 
the unequal distribution of resources. Heather, a primary school teacher, thought 
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‘everyone’s got the same chance… but some people can’t be bothered.’  One evocative way 
this was expressed was through views on immoral parenting. For Gillies (2005), policy 
discourse shifted under the New Labour government to focus on ‘bad parenting’ as the 
source of social problems, with a ‘moral majority’ scrutinising the childrearing practices and 
values of the ‘socially excluded’. We can see parallels in the parents’ views on those who 
were seen to have a negative effect on their children’s education, either directly through 
being disruptive or taking an unfair share of resources. 
 
For four of our mothers in particular, immoral sexual behaviour, bad parenting and benefits 
culture were linked, and they distanced themselves from such behaviour. Hannah, a cleaner, 
had her first child at 28 and spoke disparagingly of ‘teenage pregnancies’, whereas Deidre, a 
nurse, had her first child at 17 then divorced – but still judged young women getting 
pregnant ‘on purpose’ to gain benefits. She positioned herself as different to such young 
women as she was a hard worker and trained as nurse. Sarah, a childminder, referred to 
‘disadvantaged children whose parents don’t care’ as a concern, with problem families as 
the cause of disadvantage and inequality. Lack of achievement in education was linked to 
these immoral cultures: 
Well they should be taken out. It’s a privilege to be taught things. It’s not, you know, 
it’s – they think it’s they have to do it. It’s a waste of time and they blame the fact 
they’ve got split parents and er things like that. When we first sent [eldest child] to 
school, that was not common, but it’s – very… common, split families… And [parents] 
having three children with different fathers or mothers in school… (Julie, full-time 
parent) 
The impact of single and/or teenage mothers and ‘broken homes’ on standards of behaviour 
locates inequality in the reproducing pathological cultures of the ‘underclass’ as understood 
by Murray (1990). As well as not participating in economic relations through work, the 
underclass are viewed by Murray as making a ‘choice to break with long-established norms 
about one’s role in… the relations of social reproduction (one needs and ought to marry and 




The young people in our sample also made moral distinctions between themselves and 
others using classed language, but unlike their parents they used different negative labels, 
such as ‘chav’. One young man, Connor, was living in care, although he was in touch with his 
mother who was currently out of work. He colourfully described what chavs were like: 
Like if you get chavs like some people say, ‘oh they’ll never get an education. They’ll 
just grow up being horrible, dirty, smack-heads or druggies’ but they can’t just ‘cause 
they’re like chavs. I don’t like chavs but I don’t hate ‘em. Everyone’s like, can get a 
good education (Connor, Vocational). 
As someone who had faced considerable challenges in his life so far, Connor did not want to 
be categorised as such a delinquent. Rose was from an upwardly mobile family but she also 
talked about ‘chavs’ who were ‘really naughty people’. According to Rose, these young men 
could be distinguished because they wore ‘tracksuit bottoms’ and the young women were 
‘like orange, fake tan and stuff’ (Rose, traditional A Levels). The popularity of the term chav 
has grown in recent years (Haywood and Yar 2006; Le Grand 2015; Tyler 2013) and this was 
reflected among the language used by the young people. What distinguishes the chav from 
other terms describing the underserving poor, such as the underclass, is that in addition to 
their morally reprehensible behaviour, they are also deviant in taste and consumption 
(Haywood and Yar 2006), as Rose’s comments illustrate. Nayak (2006) notes that young 
people may not talk about class in explicit terms, but it is ‘threaded through the daily fabric 
of their lives: it is stitched into codes of respect, accent, dress, music, body adornment and 
comportment’ (2006: 828). While their parents may highlight their own respectability 
through ordinariness and critiques of parenting, the younger generation in our sample used 
the figure of the ‘chav’ to distance themselves from those who were ‘rough’ and morally 
deficient. 
  
Surprisingly, given that at the time of the interviews was shortly after the financial crash of 
2008/9, there was only one specific reference to more privileged groups as being 
responsible for inequality. 
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If it was fair – these – all these bankers now who are getting all these one point odd 
billion pounds of bonuses wouldn’t get it. Because why should we pay them when 
they’ve just lost us all that money? They shouldn’t be getting them bonuses now 
they should be giving it back (Adrian, painter & decorator) 
This came from Adrian, the same parent who was also the only interviewee to highlight class 
politics. On the basis of one example, we cannot draw any generalisations about ‘class 
consciousness’, but we can note that identifications of class disadvantage seemed to 
provide Adrian with a framework for recognising structural privilege. Yet in all of these 
discussions, we can see claims to moral hierarchies as classed, in which young people and 
their parents position themselves in relation to others. Thus our participants engaged in 
individualised positioning using classed hierarchies, even though there was only one explicit 
acknowledgement of collective class identities (Savage 2000). As noted by Tyler (2013), the 
political implications of these classifications are not whether, for example, an identifiable 
underclass exists. Instead, she argues that the question should be: what are the functions of 
such classifications? In the case of this study, how do these moralisations about the culture 
and value of others influence public discourse about social mobility? We suggest that the 
neoliberal social imaginary, which supports ‘fair chances and hard work’ for individual 
advancement, was shaping the ways that the different generations spoke about the 
education and employment opportunities open to contemporary youth. 
  
Opportunities and inequalities 
When considering the education and employment landscape facing their children, the 
parents noted different ‘opportunity structures’ (Roberts 2009) to their own. At least 10 of 
the parents had experienced the tripartite schools system, as they mentioned either passing 
or failing the ‘eleven-plus’ examvi. As we explored in greater detail in a previous paper (Snee 
and Devine 2015), there seemed to be more jobs on offer in the past. Moreover, the decline 
of manufacturing, often a source of steady work, was mourned. These views were not rose-
tinted: there was recognition of gender segregation and a sense of their being fewer 
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opportunities for mobility. In some ways, parents perceived greater choice and opportunity 
for their children in the present, particularly the chance to engage with education. 
  
However, they were concerned about the current employment market for their children, 
including job insecurity, along with an inaccessible property ladder. They saw that wealthier 
parents could provide their children with advantages that were not within the reach of 
most. These included the gains afforded by private schooling and tuition; the rising costs of 
higher education; and that some schools had greater resources than others. Credential 
inflation was another concern, indicating that parents had a realistic and informed view of 
the job marketplace. Crucially, none of the parents (except one, Adrian, discussed in the 
previous section) spoke about being antagonised by the most privileged. Their discontent 
included the extra help received by the ‘undeserving’, along with ‘bright’ children: 
… sometimes I think Cameron’s a bit middle of the road and I do think sometimes if 
your child’s very clever they get noticed, if they’re very naughty they get noticed and 
its these big chunk of people in the middle that, you know, don’t they, just sort of 
sail through’ (Deidre, Senior Nurse). 
Indeed, these views reflect the growing trend within youth studies over the lack of attention 
paid to the ‘missing middle’ (Roberts and Macdonald 2013).  
  
The tensions at work in these reflections on inequality shape the parents’ evaluations of the 
chances for young people to ‘get on’. The contradictions inherent in trying to explain such 
chances through contemporary meritocratic discourse are highlighted in Sarah’s discussion 
of one of her daughter’s fellow pupils who had been offered a place at Oxford: 
Sarah: He wasn’t from high professional parents and he’s just… through hard 
work […] I think it does depend on the person if they want to but you do need 
the backing from parents to listen to them read and doing their homework and 
things like that but at the end of the day it’s the child I think so – yeah I do think 
some probably do struggle through parents and background but – looking at schools 
and everything I think now everybody starts with an equal opportunity, it’s what they 
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make of it really and how much encouragement – it is encouragement. No it is I think 
it is down to encouragement from parents but I think education-wise – 
Interviewer: Everyone’s given a fair chance? 
Sarah: Yeah I think they’re given a fair chance. It’s what help they get outside really. 
(Sarah, childminder) 
  
The young people viewed education in the UK as more or less equal, as everyone has access 
to school. Four young people – all from middle class families – recognised the potential 
advantages of private education, but even this was not necessarily a barrier. The young 
people did worry about costs of higher education and future debt however: 
I think it’s rubbish because like, they like tell us to get as many qualifications as 
possible but there’s like people coming out of college and university and there’s no 
jobs for them to go in, and like if they have like university loans and stuff, they can’t 
pay them off ‘cause they have no job to go to and they end up in loads of debt and 
stuff, which just makes stuff worse (Jade, Traditional A-Levels). 
Such concerns, at the time of the interviews, did not seem insurmountable. Out of the 
sample of 16 young people discussed here, just two indicated they believed there were 
significant inequalities in the education system. Notably, these were children whose parents 
were from the middle class, suggesting some cultural capital in terms of knowing the ‘rules 
of the game’ (Bathmaker, Ingram and Waller 2013; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
  
Although without extended experience of the labour market, the young people could 
identify contemporary problems, and were aware that there were ‘not enough jobs’. Yet 
they did not see this as inherently unfair: 
There’s not a lot of jobs at the moment… Because of the recession and everything, 
and the good thing it that .. well like a lot – it’s – you’ve all got an even, even chance 
of getting a job if you’ve got the right qualifications (Cameron, Vocational). 
Luttrell-Rowland (2016) suggests that the recession is a way for young people to articulate 
inequality while retaining an overarching discourse of meritocracy. We might suggest the 
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individualised explanations at work in the parents’ narratives are even more pronounced in 
their children’s. Yet the complexities, ambivalences and contradictions were also apparent. 
Josh exemplified these tensions: 
Interviewer: Do you think people have an equal chance to get good jobs? 
Josh: If you get the right qualifications, yes. But if like… I don’t know. No. Yeah, they 
do but they erm, sort of don’t, potentially (Josh, Vocational) 
It is not our intention to claim that young people – or their parents – should necessarily be 
able to articulate the complexities of the contemporary education and employment 
landscape off the cuff. Yet their thoughts highlight the way the neoliberal social imaginary 
encourages the acceptance of discourses concerning the source of material inequality, 
which rest on moralised and implicitly classed notions of pathological cultures (Angus, 2015; 
Ball, 2012). Rivzi and Lingard (2013: 13) note that the authority of the nation state requires 
the ‘inculcation of a social imaginary that cannot conceive of how things could be 
otherwise’, a form of ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1998). Here we would add that the 
denial of class privilege in a period of growing economic inequalities is an example of how 
the (neoliberal) social imaginary enables the misrecognition of meritocracy, where the social 
position of both the dominant and dominated is ‘earned’ and is thus also an act of symbolic 
violence (Bourdieu 1990). 
  
Gender divisions were more explicitly recognised in our participant’s discussions of 
inequality. While we have seen a decline in class politics, we have seen a rise in awareness 
of ‘gender issues’, arguably due to the influence of feminism, particularly since the 1970s 
(Bradley 2016). The parents were able to articulate gendered experiences of work and 
education in their own and also older generations. Talking about his mother, Nick reflected 
on the limited choices for women in the past: 
So her father didn’t think it was right that she went to university which as a woman 
most women would think totally opposite. So she never got, she could have gone to 
university. She was adequately academic and everything but he wouldn’t let her go 
you see […] But times were different then for women (Nick, Small Business Owner). 
20 
 
Bottero (2012) suggests when people make temporal comparisons about inequality, they 
often see improvements thanks to social change, but this does not mean that they cannot 
also see ongoing relative inequalities. Consequently, Nick wanted to ensure that his three 
daughters were not restricted by gender roles, and wanted them to become ‘independent 
women’. 
  
Gendered paths in education and employment did not explicitly feature in the young 
people’s narratives. However, the planned trajectories of these young men and women 
suggested gendered patterns in their aspirations. Our young men aspired to the army; 
engineering; the police; creative industries; and self-employed trades such as electrician. 
The young women hoped for careers in nursing; teaching; law; fashion/beauty; sports 
therapy; and dance. While parents reflected on the greater freedoms that their daughters 
especially had compared to previous generations, gender norms were still operating in 
guiding their children’s choices. Of particular concern for both mothers and daughters was 
the perceived restrictions of motherhood for having a career. 
  
In an earlier article (Snee and Devine 2015) we highlighted the classed nature of family 
formation (Crompton 2006) in our sample, with four of our mothers getting married and/or 
having children while still teenagers, and all of the parents had their first child before 30. 
The implications of motherhood for work/life trajectories was a key issue for both 
generations of women. The young women themselves spoke of wanting to delay having 
children and rejected the label of ‘housewife’, seen as a relic of the past that meant that 
they could not live their full potential.  In these narratives, the ‘correct’ aspiration for young 
women is that of the middle class norm; the pursuit of education and a career is to be 
prioritised over family life and children. 
  
Their mothers also spoke of the importance of delaying having children – or indeed not 
having them at all: 
Interviewer: What do you imagine for your kids? What do you imagine for Lucy? 
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June: Lucy? Well I just … and I’m being totally honest now, I hope she just has a good 
career, maybe no children, does that surprise you? But saying I’ve got children – but 
I wouldn’t again. [...] I really don’t see what is out there so I’d say to her get a job 
and if there’s opportunities to go abroad, go (June, accounts supervisor). 
There is a strong sense of escape in June’s account, in which she hopes for a different life for 
her daughter than her own and ideally, one outside the UK. Emigrating was an aspiration for 
both the young men and women themselves: Holly, Richard and Connor spoke of hoping to 
live in America in the future; Cameron imagined a better life with his own business in 
Australia; and Jacob and Rebecca looked ahead to simply living ‘overseas’. However, the 
perceived limitations of having a young family – and reproducing the classed family 
formation of previous generations – was applied only to daughters. There is optimism in 
these pictures of the future, given perceptions of reduced gender inequality, but also 
anxiety that young women may become ‘stuck’. Consequently, social mobility for young 
women in particular is driven by being able to ‘get on’ by ‘getting away’ (Lawler 1999).  
  
Conclusions: fair chances and hard work? 
The neoliberal social imaginary is one in which social mobility is possible for those with who 
work hard. It frames fairness as equality of opportunity, not outcome, and accompanies 
trends in class dis-identification. In this paper, we have discussed how this shapes everyday 
talk about inequality when parents and children reflect on young people’s opportunities, 
looking to the past, present and future. Both generations distanced themselves from class 
labels, and class was an indicator of personal qualities rather than a collective identity. 
Unfairness within this system is about the preferential treatment of underserving others 
such as ‘bad parents’ or ‘chavs’. Such labels are micro acts of symbolic violence in which 
class is implicit in moralised judgements, even if it is explicitly renounced (Bourdieu 1990; 
Skeggs 1997). This does not mean that our participants were completely unaware of 
inequality. The older generation acknowledged the unequal distribution of resources, and 
while there was more ambivalence in the young people’s narratives, they were still aware of 
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class stigma. We also some found more explicit discussions of gender inequality, with hopes 
that young women would escape the restrictions of the past. 
  
Our participants had largely accepted the dominant messages of fair chances and hard work 
as a ‘moral imperative’ (Littler 2013: 66). Yet our interviews also show how opportunities 
and inequalities are understood in complex and sometimes contradictory ways. France and 
Haddon (2014) note that such contradictions do not mean young people are ‘blind’ to their 
circumstances. Instead, these narratives highlight the problems inherent in trying to 
articulate transitions in an unequal system using dominant language (Luttrell-Rowland 
2016). They are inconsistent precisely because justifying a hierarchical education system 
through appeals to fairness is, in itself, contradictory (Reay 2013: 48). Savage et al. (2015) 
point to the inherent problems with meritocratic politics, given the evidence for drastically 
widening economic inequalities and how competitive education markets mean that those 
with the most resources will win the ‘race to the top’. Such comments are located in a wider 
picture of class in contemporary Britain which we see traces of in our participants’ 
narratives: where those who are at the bottom of the class structure are stigmatised and 
stereotyped, while those at the top remain relatively unscrutinised; where the middle of the 
class structure is fragmented along the accumulation of different resources; and where 
these resources intersect and interplay to maximise accumulation for the already 
advantaged (Savage et al. 2015). 
  
We are cautious about making claims that the parents and children in our sample constitute 
different ‘political generations’ (Grasso et al. 2017). While class dis-identification may 
become more entrenched among the young people, and the ‘abject others’ (Tyler 2013) 
used to establish their own respectability may be different from their parents, we also have 
to recognise that they have fewer life experiences to draw on to consider issues of 
inequality. Future work would be beneficial to conduct more analysis on classed patterns in 
subjectivities around inequality and social mobility than we have available in our data – for 
example, is positional competition understood differently by different class fractions (Brown 
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2013)? Moreover, space here has not allowed a discussion of how ‘race’ and ethnicity 
intersect with classed and gendered discourses around fairness. We find the concept of the 
‘social imaginary’ useful because it allows an understanding of how people not only view the 
world around them, but also what they consider to be possible in the future. The fact that 
the concepts of meritocracy and social mobility, rather than solidarity and shared goals, 
seem so entrenched among our participants indicate a political need to promote alternative 
imaginaries that are instead concerned with social justice (Angus 2015). Critical sociology 
undoubtedly has a role to play here, but the challenge is to then to inform greater public 
debate around the dominant understandings of social mobility and question the legitimacy 
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ii Including White Irish and White Other. 
iii The young people’s pathways were characterised as whether they were taking ‘traditional’ A 
Levels (if they chose at least one of the ‘facilitating subjects’ as defined by the Russell Group (2012); 
as ‘new’ A Levels if they were not taking any of the facilitating subjects; and vocational/other if they 
had chosen courses that were not A Levels or indeed were not in education the following year. 
iv See Snee and Devine (2015) for a detailed discussion of social resources in ‘taking the next step’. 
v The ‘chav’ is ‘a widely circulated stereotype typically constructed around young White British 
people dressed in streetwear clothing and jewellery’ (Le Grand 2015: 5.1). 
vi These exams at the end of primary schooling determined whether pupils entered a grammar 
school (with the best opportunities and the chance to take academic exams), secondary modern (for 
those intended for vocational routes or routine labour) or technical schools (a less common path 
focused on industry). 
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Table 1: The Final Sample of Interviewees: Young People and Parents 
  
Young person Young person’s 
route 
Parent(s) Parent occupation 
Richard Blake Traditional A Levels Adam Blake 
Sarah Blake 
Partner in accounting firm 
Childminder 
Lucy Grey Traditional A Levels June Grey Accounts supervisor 
Emily King Traditional A Levels Nick King 
Julie King 
Owns small business 
Full time parent 
Jade Maxwell * Traditional A Levels Tanya Maxwell Project Officer 
Rose Maxwell* Traditional A Levels Tanya Maxwell Project Officer 
Joe Shaw Traditional A Levels Kathy Shaw Optician 
Jacob Wills Traditional A Levels Mary Wills Former nurse 
        
Tony Edwards New A Levels Elaine Goodwin Postal worker 
Amanda Wynn New A Levels Lois Wynn Housing officer 
Sadie Wood New A Levels Heather Wood Primary school teacher 
        
Josh Adams Vocational/other Hannah Adams Cleaner 
Aaron Croft Vocational/other Jane Lewis Not employed (ill health) 




Rebecca Jenkins Vocational/other Aileen Jenkins 
Adrian Jenkins 
Carer 
Painter and decorator 
Connor Roberts Vocational/other Jill Richards (carer) ** (Mother: not employed) 
Holly Tomlinson Vocational/other Clare Tomlinson Call centre worker 
* Jade and Rose were twin sisters. 
** Connor lived in a children’s home although he saw his mother nearly every day. Advice 









Background Education and training Occupation 
Working class * 
Hannah 
Adams 
M: Factory worker 
F: Factory worker 






F: Small business 
owner 





M: Home help 
F: Painter and 
decorator 
Left school at 16 
NVQ 3 in Health & Social Care 
Carer 
Jane Lewis ** M: Shopkeeper 
F: Welder 
Left School at 16 with 2 CSEs Not employed 
Jill Richards M: Full-time parent 
F: Manufacturing 
worker  
Left school at 15½. National Nursery 
Examination Board (NNEB) 
Carer 
Intermediate class * 
Sarah Blake M: Full-time parent 
F: Building contractor 
Left school at 16 with CSEs. Childminder 
June Grey M: Retail worker 
F: Electrician 
Left school at 17 – gave up place at 
nursing college 
Accounts supervisor 
Nick King M: Bank clerk 
F: Mechanic 
Retook O Levels at 6th form. 
Commercial apprenticeship at 
engineering firm. HND at night school 
Small business owner 
Julie King ** M: Shopkeeper 
F: Coalman 
Catering management course. Full-time parent 
Noel Hayes M: Office manager 
F: Teacher 
Left school at 16 with O Levels. 
Started hotel catering management 




M: Legal Exec 
F: Pipe layer 
Left school at 16. Apprenticeship as 
refrigeration technician. 
Painter and decorator  
Clare 
Tomlinson 
M: Worked in 
insurance office 
F: Small business 
owner 
Secretarial college Call centre worker 
Middle class * 
Adam Blake M: Bookkeeper 
F: Teacher 
Left school at 16. Professional 
accountancy qualifications at night 
school. 




Deidre Hayes M: Shopkeeper 
F: (No data) 
Started A Levels but left when 





M: Full-time parent 
F: Sheet metal worker 
Left school at 16. Banking 
qualifications 
Project Officer 
Kathy Shaw M: Secretary 
F: Plumber 
A Levels. On the job training as 
optician. 
Optician 
Mary Wills M: Nurse 
F: Welder 
Started A Levels but did not complete. 
Nurses’ training 
Former nurse 









Left school at 16. Studied to teach 
sports development while working. 
Primary school 
teacher 
* Parents were organised into class categories based on their occupation. 
** Based on previous employment history 
 
 
 
 
 
